CSP-Assessor Customer Security Programme Assessor Certification(CSPAC) Questions and Answers

This question identifies the supporting documents for a CSP assessment under theSwift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Assessment Documentation

TheIndependent Assessment FrameworkandCSCF v2024specify the documents assessors must use to evaluate compliance with CSCF controls.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. The CSP User HandbookTheSwift CSP User Handbookprovides guidance on CSP requirements, processes, and best practices, making it a key supporting document for assessors.Conclusion: Correct.

B. The mapping to industry standards articleWhile useful for context, this article is not a primary document for conducting assessments. TheCSCF v2024focuses on its own controls, not industry mappings, which are advisory.Conclusion: Incorrect.

C. The Controls Matrix and High Level Test PlanTheControls Matrix(part of the CSCF) maps controls to components, and theHigh Level Test Planoutlines assessment procedures. Both are essential for structuring and executing the assessment, per theIndependent Assessment Framework.Conclusion: Correct.

D. The Customer Security Controls FrameworkTheCSCF v2024is the foundational document defining controls and requirements, mandatory for all assessments.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answers areA, C, and D, as these documents are explicitly referenced in theCSCF v2024andIndependent Assessment Frameworkfor conducting CSP assessments.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Section: Assessment Guidance.

Swift Independent Assessment Framework, Section: Supporting Documents.

Swift CSP User Handbook, Section: Assessment Process.

This question addresses the process for resolving uncertainty about the applicability of a CSCF control to a specific component.

Step 1: Understand the CSCF Documentation Structure

TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024provides detailed guidance on control applicability, including sections like the Introduction and appendices, as well as support mechanisms for users.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. Call your Swift contactWhile contacting a Swift representative might be helpful, it is not the first recommended step inthe CSCF documentation. The framework prioritizes self-service through documentation and support channels like swift.com before direct contact.Conclusion: This is not a primary step.

B. Check appendix F of the CSCFAppendix F of theCSCF v2024provides detailed guidance on control applicability, including scenarios, architecture types, and component mappings. It is a key resource for clarifying whether a control applies to a specific component.Conclusion: This is correct.

C. Check carefully the Introduction section of the CSCFThe Introduction section of theCSCF v2024outlines the scope, objectives, and applicability of controls, including definitions of in-scope components and architecture types. It’s a critical starting point for understanding control applicability.Conclusion: This is correct.

D. Open a case with Swift support via the case manager on swift.com if further information or solution cannot be found in the documentationIf the CSCF documentation (e.g., Introduction, Appendix F) does not resolve the uncertainty, theSwift CSP FAQandSwift Support Guidelinesrecommend opening a case via the swift.com case manager. This ensures users can get official clarification from Swift support.Conclusion: This is correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The verified steps areB, C, and D, as they align with the recommended process in theCSCF v2024for resolving uncertainty about control applicability: first consult the documentation (Introduction and Appendix F), then escalate to Swift support if needed.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Introduction Section and Appendix F.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Resolving Control Applicability.

Swift Support Guidelines, Section: Case Manager Usage.

This question asks whether a Swift user can implement security controls (e.g., logging and monitoring) in systems not directly in scope of the CSCF. Let’s analyze this based on Swift CSP guidelines.

Step 1: Define CSCF Scope and Security Controls

TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024defines its scope as the Swift-related infrastructure, including messaging interfaces, communication interfaces, and operator systems (asdetailed in Question 4). Security controls likelogging and monitoringare mandated underControl Objective 6: Detect Anomalous Activity, specifically in controls likeControl 6.1: Security Event Logging.

Step 2: Analyze the Question

The question focuses on whether a Swift user can apply CSCF security controls (e.g., logging and monitoring) to systemsnot directly in scopeof the CSCF. Systems not in scope include back-office systems, general-purpose servers, or other infrastructure that does not directly process Swift messages or connect to the Swift network.

Step 3: Evaluate Swift CSP Guidance

The CSCF mandates that security controls must be applied to in-scope systems to ensure the security of the Swift environment. However, Swift also encourages adefense-in-depthapproach, as outlined in theSwift Customer Security Programme – Security Best Practices. This approach recommends extending security practices beyond the minimum scope to enhance overall security.

Control 6.1: Security Event Loggingrequires logging and monitoring for in-scope systems to detect anomalous activity. While this control is mandatory for in-scope systems, the CSCF does not prohibit applying similar controls to out-of-scope systems. In fact, theSwift CSP FAQ(available on swift.com) clarifies that users may implement additional security measures on out-of-scope systems to reduce risks to the Swift environment (e.g., monitoring back-office systems that interact with Swift middleware).

Implementing logging and monitoring on out-of-scope systems can help detect threats that might indirectly affect the Swift environment, such as lateral movement from a compromised back-office system to a Swift-related system.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

A Swift usercanchoose to implement security controls like logging and monitoring on systems not directly in scope of the CSCF. This is not mandatory but is considered a best practice under Swift’s defense-in-depth strategy. The CSCF does not restrict users from applying additional security measures beyond its defined scope, and such actions align with the broader goal of enhancing cybersecurity across the user’s environment.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 6.1: Security Event Logging.

Swift Customer Security Programme – Security Best Practices, Section: Defense-in-Depth.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Scope and Applicability of Security Controls.

The High-Level Test Plan (HLTP) is outlined in the "Independent Assessment Framework - High-Level Test Plan Guidelines" and serves as a guidance document for assessors. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: The HLTP provides a way of testing and the typical evidence for each control (based on implementation guidelines) and must be strictly followed

This is incorrect. The HLTP is a recommended framework, not a strict mandate. Assessors have flexibility to adapt testing approaches based on the user’s environment, as per the "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines."

•Option B: The HLTP provides a way of testing and the typical evidence for each control (based on implementation guidelines), testing should be ideally based on it

This is correct. The HLTP offers a standardized methodology and evidence examples for testing CSCF controls, derived from implementation guidelines. The "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" encourages assessors to use it as a best practice, allowing adjustments as needed.

•Option C: The HLTP provides the rules to define the sample for testing

This is incorrect. While the HLTP includes sample size guidance (e.g., minimum of 3 for limited testing), its primary purpose is broader, covering testing methods and evidence, not just sampling rules.

•Option D: The HLTP provides a detailed way of control testing

This is incorrect. The HLTP is high-level, not detailed; detailed testing plans are developed by assessors based on the HLTP framework.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The HLTP provides testing methods and evidence, and testing should ideally be based on it (B).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Framework - High-Level Test Plan Guidelines: Defines HLTP purpose.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Recommends HLTP usage.

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Allows flexibility.

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The CSCF requires protection of operator session flows to ensure confidentiality and integrity, particularly for sessions involving SWIFT-related components. This is addressed under Control "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security" and "2.2 External Transmission Security." Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: System administrator sessions towards a host running a SWIFT-related component (on-premises or remote)

This is valid. System administrator sessions to hosts running SWIFT components (e.g., Alliance Gateway on-premises or in the cloud) must be protected using encryption (e.g., TLS) and authentication to prevent unauthorized access or data breaches, aligning with CSCF Control "2.1."

•Option B: All sessions to and from a jump server used to access a component in a secure zone

This is valid. Jump servers (bastion hosts) used to access the secure zone (e.g., for managing Alliance Access) must have all sessions encrypted and integrity-checked, as required by CSCF Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection" and "2.2" to secure access points.

•Option C: All sessions towards a SWIFT-related application run by an Outsourcing Agent, a Service Bureau, or an L2BA Provider

This is valid. Sessions to applications hosted by third parties (e.g., Alliance Lite2 Business Application by an L2BA Provider) must be protected, as per CSCF Control "2.2" and the "Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025," which mandates secure transmission regardless of location.

•Option D: All of the other answers are valid

This is correct. Since A, B, and C all describe session flows that require protection under the CSCF, the comprehensive answer is that all listed session types must be secured for confidentiality and integrity.

Summary of Correct Answer:

All operator session flows listed (A, B, and C) are expected to be protected, making D the correct choice.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Controls 2.1 and 2.2 mandate session protection.

•Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025: Extends protection to third-party-hosted applications.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Includes all listed session types in security testing.

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This question addresses the terminology related to VPN boxes in the Swift environment and their association with managed-customer premises equipment (M-CPE). Let’s verify this based on Swift CSP documentation.

Step 1: Understand VPN Boxes and M-CPE in Swift Context

In the Swift ecosystem, VPN boxes are typically part of the connectivity infrastructure used to establish secure tunnels (e.g., Network Transport Layer Security - NTLS) for communication with the Swift network. The term "managed-customer premises equipment (M-CPE)" generally refers to hardware or devices managed by a service provider or third party on the customer’s premises, often in telecommunications or IT contexts. TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024and related technical documentation provide insights into Swift’s infrastructure terminology.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The statement claims that the "cluster of VPN boxes is also called managed-customer premises equipment (M-CPE)." We need to determine if this is an official or recognized designation within the Swift CSP.

Step 3: Evaluate Against Swift CSP Guidelines

TheSwift Alliance Gateway Technical DocumentationandSwift Security Best Practicesdescribe VPN boxes (or similar connectivity devices) as part of the SwiftNet Link (SNL) infrastructure, often deployed at the user’s premises to secure communications. These devices are typically managed by the Swift user or a designated service provider, depending on the architecture (e.g., A2 or A4).

The term "M-CPE" is not specifically defined or used in Swift CSP documentation (e.g.,CSCF v2024,Swift User Handbook, orSwift Network Security Guidelines). Instead, Swift refers to such equipment as part of the "customer premises equipment (CPE)" when managed by the user, or as "managed services" when outsourced to a provider. However, "M-CPE" as a specific term for a cluster of VPN boxes is not corroborated.

In some IT contexts outside Swift, M-CPE might imply managed equipment, but Swift’s documentation does not adopt this terminology for VPN clusters, which are considered part of the broader connectivity infrastructure.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The statement isFALSEbecause theCSCF v2024and related Swift documentation do not use "managed-customer premises equipment (M-CPE)" as a term for a cluster of VPN boxes. The correct terminology aligns with "customer premises equipment" or "managed connectivity devices," depending on the setup, but not specifically M-CPE.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection.

Swift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation, Section: Connectivity Infrastructure.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Network Security Devices.

The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" mandates record-keeping for CSP assessments. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: To support quality review (audit) processes

This applies. Minutes are required to facilitate quality reviews or audits by SWIFT or third parties, ensuring assessment integrity, as per the guidelines.

•Option B: For documentation purpose

This applies. Documentation is a core requirement to maintain a record of decisions and findings, supporting the "Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template" and assessment traceability.

•Option C: To keep key information that can be used as input for the next step in the assessment process

This applies. Minutes capture critical details (e.g., scope changes) that inform subsequent assessment phases, aligning with the assessment workflow.

•Option D: To be uploaded in KYC-SA at the end of the assessment (mandated by SWIFT)

This does not apply. The KYC-SA portal requires the assessment report and completion letter, not meeting minutes, as per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

Summary of Correct Answers:

Minutes are kept to support quality reviews (A), for documentation (B), and as input for the next step (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Mandates minutes for these purposes.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Supports documentation and review.

•Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template: Relies on documented records.

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Alliance Messaging Hub (AMH) is a SWIFT product designed as a centralized messaging platform for financial institutions, enabling them to manage multiple messaging flows, including SWIFT and non-SWIFT networks. Let’s evaluate each statement:

•Statement A: AMH is highly resilient, and can consist of multiple instances and sites in parallel

This is true. AMH is designed for high availability and resilience, supporting deployments across multiple instances and sites to ensure continuity of operations. This capability is critical for large financial institutions handling high volumes of transactions. SWIFT documentation highlights AMH’s ability to operate in a distributed architecture, with instances running in parallel across primary and backup sites. This aligns with CSCF Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection," which emphasizes the need for resilient infrastructure to prevent disruptions in the SWIFT environment.

•Statement B: AMH provides advanced integration capabilities

This is true. AMH offers advanced integration features, allowing institutions to connect various back-office systems, payment engines, and other financial applications to a single hub. It supports multiple message standards (e.g., SWIFT MT, ISO 20022) and provides transformation and routing capabilities, making it a versatile integration platform. This is a key selling point of AMH, as noted in SWIFT’s product documentation, enabling seamless interoperability across diverse systems.

•Statement C: AMH is a messaging interface able to connect to other financial networks, not only SWIFT

This is true. AMH is not limited to SWIFT messaging; it can connect to other financial networks, such as domestic payment systems, real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems, or proprietary networks. AMH acts as a universal messaging hub, supporting multiple protocols and standards beyond SWIFT’s ecosystem (e.g., FIX for securities trading). This capability is well-documented in SWIFT’s AMH product overview, positioning it as a flexible solution for institutions with diverse connectivity needs.

•Statement D: All of the above

Since all three statements (A, B, and C) are true, this option is the correct answer. AMH’s design for resilience, advanced integration, and multi-network connectivity makes it a comprehensive messaging solution.

Summary of Correct Answer:

All statements about AMH are true, making "All of the above" (D) the correct choice.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.1 emphasizes resilience, which AMH supports through its architecture.

•SWIFT Alliance Messaging Hub Documentation: Highlights AMH’s multi-site resilience, integration capabilities, and support for non-SWIFT networks.

•SWIFT Product Overview: Describes AMH as a universal messaging hub for SWIFT and other financial networks.

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This question pertains to Local Security Officer (LSO) and Remote Security Officer (RSO) accounts on SWIFT Alliance Access, a key component of the SWIFT infrastructure. Let’s evaluate each statement:

A. They are local Security Officers

LSOs and RSOs are indeed Security Officers responsible for managing security functions on Alliance Access. LSOs operate locally, while RSOs can perform tasks remotely, but both are classified as Security Officers under SWIFT’s terminology.

This question identifies the components with which the SwiftNet Link (SNL) communicates, based on its role in the Swift ecosystem under theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024.

Step 1: Understand the Role of SwiftNet Link (SNL)

The SNL is a communication layer that facilitates secure connectivity between a Swift user’s environment and the Swift network. It handles encrypted data transmission and interacts with specific infrastructure components, as detailed in theSwift Alliance Gateway Technical DocumentationandControl 1.1: Swift Environment Protectionof theCSCF v2024.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. The Graphical User InterfaceThe GUI (e.g., operator interface) is used by personnel to interact with Swift applications (e.g., Alliance Access), but it does not directly communicate with the SNL. The SNL operates at the network and security layer, not the user interface layer, per theSwift User Handbook.Conclusion: Incorrect.

B. The VPN boxesThe SNL communicates with VPN boxes to establish secure tunnels (e.g., using NTLS) for data transmission to the Swift network, as specified in theSwift Security Best PracticesandControl 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restriction.Conclusion: Correct.

C. The HSM deviceThe SNL interacts with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to manage cryptographic keys and secure communications, as outlined inControl 2.5B: Cryptographic Key Managementand theSwift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation.Conclusion: Correct.

D. The messaging interface (such as Alliance Access)The SNL connects to the messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access or Entry) to transmit and receive Swift messages, a core function described in theCSCF v2024underControl 1.1.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answers areB, C, and D, as the SNL communicates with VPN boxes, HSM devices, and messaging interfaces to ensure secure and functional connectivity to the Swift network, consistent withCSCF v2024and related documentation.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection, Control 2.5B: Cryptographic Key Management, Control 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restriction.

Swift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation, Section: SNL Communication.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Network Infrastructure.

The Hardware Security Module (HSM) Box is a critical component for managing cryptographic keys in the SWIFT environment. Hardening at the system level involves securing the HSM’s operating system and configuration against vulnerabilities. Let’s evaluate:

•CSCF Control "2.3 System Hardening" mandates that all SWIFT-related systems, including the HSM Box, be hardened to reduce the attack surface. This is the responsibility of the SWIFT user owning the equipment, as outlined in the "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025."

•The "Assessment template for Mandatory controls" requires users to demonstrate hardening of owned HSMs, including patching, disabling unused services, and enforcing access controls.

•If the HSM is owned by the user (e.g., in an on-premises A1 or A2 architecture), the user must perform hardening. This differs from cloud deployments (e.g., A4), where the provider may handle it, but the question specifies user-owned equipment.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The SWIFT user owning the HSM Box must harden it at the system level (TRUE).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 2.3 requires system hardening.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Specifies user responsibility for owned HSMs.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Includes HSM hardening in assessments.

The "Swift Customer Security Controls Policy" and "Independent Assessment Framework" outline the consequences of non-compliance with the CSP. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: To be reported to their supervisors (if applicable)

This does not apply. Non-compliance is managed by SWIFT, not internal reporting to supervisors, unless specified by the user’s internal governance (not a CSP requirement).

•Option B: To be seen as non-compliant to their counterparts in KYC-SA

This applies. Non-compliance is reflected in the KYC-SA portal, where counterparties can view the user’s status, impacting trust and business relationships, as per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

•Option C: To be contacted by SWIFT to provide the CSP assessment report and detailed information about the reason of non-compliance

This applies. SWIFT engages with non-compliant users, requesting assessment reports and remediation plans, as outlined in the "Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template" and "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines."

•Option D: To be delisted from the BIC directory

This does not apply. Delisting is an extreme measure not automatically triggered by non-compliance; it requires persistent failure to remediate after engagement, which is not guaranteed.

Summary of Correct Answers:

Possible impacts include being seen as non-compliant in KYC-SA (B) and being contacted by SWIFT for reports (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Framework: Details non-compliance impacts.

•Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template: Supports SWIFT follow-up.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Reflects KYC-SA visibility.

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The SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) defines the scope of components that must comply with its security controls, particularly those handling SWIFT-related data or connectivity. Let’s analyze the scenario:

•A Treasury Management System (TMS) application is a back-office system used to manage financial operations, such as payments or liquidity management. A customer connector is a custom application or integration layer that connects the user’s systems (e.g., TMS) to the SWIFT infrastructure, in this case via a Service Bureau. The hosting system is the physical or virtual machine on which both applications are installed.

•The TMS and customer connector are on the same machine, and the customer connector connects to a Service Bureau, which hosts the SWIFT communication infrastructure (e.g., Alliance Gateway).

•CSCF Scope: The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" define the scope as including:

oCustomer connectors: These are in scope because they facilitate SWIFT connectivity (e.g., sending/receiving SWIFT messages), even if connecting via a Service Bureau.

oSystems hosting in-scope components: The hosting system (machine) is in scope because it runs the customer connector, which is directly involved in SWIFT data flows.

oBack-office systems (e.g., TMS): Normally, back-office systems are out of scope unless they are closely integrated with SWIFT infrastructure. In this case, the TMS is installed on the same machine as the customer connector, creating a shared environment. The CSCF considers systems in the same environment as in-scope if they could impact the security of SWIFT-related components (e.g., Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection").

•Service Bureau Context: Connecting to a Service Bureau (architecture type A2) does not exempt the local components from CSCF scope. The "Independent Assessment Framework" requires assessing all local components that interact with SWIFT, even if the communication layer is outsourced.

•Option A: The TMS application, the customer connector, and the hosting system are in the scope of the CSCF

This is correct. The customer connector is explicitly in scope as it handles SWIFT data flows. The hosting system is in scope because it runs the connector. The TMS, while typically a back-office system, is in scope because it shares the same machine, creating a risk of lateral movement or privilege escalation (e.g., CSCF Control "1.1"). The "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" includes shared environments in the assessment scope.

•Option B: Only the customer connector application is in scope of the CSCF. The TMS application is a back-office

This is incorrect. While the TMS is a back-office system, its co-location on the same machine as the customer connector brings it into scope due to shared risks, as per CSCF guidelines.

•Option C: The TMS application is the highest risk and must be secured appropriately. The customer connector should be secured on a best effort basis

This is incorrect. The CSCF does not prioritize the TMS as the "highest risk" nor suggest "best effort" security for the customer connector. Both components must be secured per mandatory controls when in scope.

•Option D: The TMS application, the customer connector, and the hosting system are in scope only if they connect directly to SWIFT, not towards a Service Bureau

This is incorrect. The CSCF scope includes components connecting via a Service Bureau, as they still handle SWIFT data and are part of the user’s architecture (e.g., A2).

Summary of Correct Answer:

The TMS application, customer connector, and hosting system are all in scope of the CSCF (A) due to their shared environment and connectivity to SWIFT via a Service Bureau.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 1.1 includes shared environments in scope.

•CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree: Classifies A2 for Service Bureau setups with local connectors.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Requires assessing all components in shared environments.

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The SWIFT CSP requires users to maintain compliance with the CSCF controls and submit attestations via the KYC-SA (Know Your Customer - Security Attestation) portal. The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" outline the process for handling non-compliance. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: The user must remediate all the exceptions within 3 months before submitting the CSP attestation in KYC-SA

This is incorrect. While SWIFT encourages prompt remediation, there is no strict 3-month deadline mandated by the CSP for resolving all exceptions before submission. The "Independent Assessment Framework" allows submission with open exceptions, provided they are documented and a remediation plan is in place.

•Option B: The SWIFT user may remediate the exceptions and then re-submit an attestation reflecting the new compliance status, but only after compliance validation by the same independent assessor

This is incorrect. The CSP does not require the same independent assessor to re-validate compliance. Any certified assessor can perform the follow-up assessment, as per the "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines."

•Option C: The SWIFT user may remediate the exceptions and re-submit an updated attestation reflecting the new compliance status but only after compliance validation by an independent assessor

This is correct. The "Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template" and "Independent Assessment Framework" allow users to remediate exceptions and submit an updated attestation. However, the updated compliance status must be validated by an independent assessor to ensure objectivity and meet CSP requirements. The user can submit an initial attestation with exceptions, followed by a re-assessment after remediation.

•Option D: The attestation cannot be submitted before all exceptions are resolved

This is incorrect. The CSP permits submission of an attestation with open exceptions, provided they are disclosed and a remediation plan is submitted, as outlined in the "CSCF Assessment Completion Letter" guidelines.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The SWIFT user may remediate exceptions and re-submit an updated attestation after validation by an independent assessor (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Allows submission with exceptions and remediation plans.

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Requires independent validation for updated attestations.

•Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template: Supports re-assessment after remediation.

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Control 4.2 of the Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) mandates the implementation of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to "prevent compromise of a single authentication factor allowing access to SWIFT systems." The control applies to various access points within the SWIFT environment to ensure robust security. Let’s evaluate each option against CSCF v2024 and related guidelines:

A. When accessing an outsourcing agent or an L2BA Swift-related application

CSCF v2024 Control 4.2 explicitly states that MFA is required for "SWIFT-related applications or components managed by third-party service providers" (e.g., outsourcing agents) and Level 2 Business Applications (L2BA). This ensures that external entitieshandling SWIFT-related processes adhere to the same security standards. The scope includes any operator access to these applications, making MFA mandatory here.

This question relates to the objective of Control 1.1 – SWIFT Environment Protection in the CSCF:

Step 1: Control 1.1 Overview

Control 1.1 aims to “restrict access to the SWIFT infrastructure by segregating it from the general IT environment and external threats,” protecting against unauthorized access and malware.

The CSCF, under Control "6.1 Security Awareness" and related security controls, mandates the definition and implementation of a Password/PIN Policy for components requiring user authentication to protect the SWIFT environment. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Operator PCs, (physical or virtual) systems running SWIFT-related components, network devices protecting the secure zone(s), bridging servers

This requires a Password/PIN Policy. Operator PCs, systems running SWIFT components (e.g., Alliance Access), network devices (e.g., VPN boxes), and bridging servers need authentication policies to secure access, as per CSCF Control "2.3 System Hardening" and "6.1."

•Option B: Jump server(s), SWIFT-related components at application level

This requires a Password/PIN Policy. Jump servers and application-level components (e.g., Alliance Gateway) must have authentication mechanisms to protect the secure zone, aligning with CSCF Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection."

•Option C: Personal tokens or mobile devices used as a possession factor

This does not require a Password/PIN Policy. Personal tokens or mobile devices (e.g., secure code cards or soft tokens) are possession factors used in multi-factor authentication (MFA), typically alongside a password or PIN. However, the CSCF does not mandate defining a Password/PIN Policy for thetokens/devices themselves, as their security relies on physical possession and manufacturer hardening, not user-defined policies. The "Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025" supports this by focusing policy requirements on systems, not possession factors.

•Option D: All equipment within the user environment

This requires a Password/PIN Policy. The CSCF applies policies to all in-scope equipment to ensure comprehensive security, contradicting the question’s intent to identify an exception.

Summary of Correct Answer:

A Password/PIN Policy must not be defined and implemented for personal tokens or mobile devices used as a possession factor (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 6.1 and 2.3 mandate password policies for systems.

•Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025: Excludes possession factors from policy requirements.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Focuses on system authentication policies.

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This question examines the applicability of internet access restrictions under theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024.

Step 1: Understand Internet Access Restrictions

Control 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restrictionof theCSCF v2024requires restricting internet access for Swift-related components to minimize exposure, applicable to both secure zones and other in-scope systems.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The question asks if the restriction is only relevant when Swift-related components are in a secure zone, implying a scope limitation.

Step 3: Evaluate Each Option

A. Yes, because if there is no secure zone then the internet connectivity does not need to be restrictedIncorrect.Control 2.6applies to all in-scope components, not just those in secure zones. For example, operator PCs accessing hosted applications (e.g., via A3 architecture) must have restricted internet access, per theSwift Security Best Practices.Conclusion: Incorrect.

B. No, because there can be in-scope general operator PCs used to access a Swift-related application hosted at a service providerCorrect. General operator PCs (e.g., Component B in the diagram) are in scope when accessing Swift applications (e.g., hosted by a service provider in A3 architecture).Control 2.6requires internet restriction for these systems, even outside a secure zone, as confirmed in theCSCF v2024andSwift Outsourcing Guidelines.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answer isB, asControl 2.6mandates internet access restrictions for all in-scope components, including operator PCs accessing hosted Swift applications, not just those in secure zones.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restriction.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Internet Access Controls.

Swift Outsourcing Guidelines, Section: Operator PC Security.

This question examines the messaging capabilities of Alliance Lite2 under the Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Alliance Lite2

Alliance Lite2 is a lightweight Swift solution designed for smaller financial institutions, providing access to Swift messaging services. Its capabilities are detailed in theSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guideand referenced in theCSCF v2024context.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The statement claims that Alliance Lite2 "only supports the sending and receiving of FIN messages." FIN messages are part of the FIN service for payment transactions, but Alliance Lite2’s scope extends beyond this.

Step 3: Evaluate Against Swift Guidelines

TheSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guidespecifies that Alliance Lite2 supports multiple message types, including:

FIN messages(e.g., MT103 for payments).

FileAct(for file transfers).

InterAct(for real-time messaging).

TheCSCF v2024does not restrict Alliance Lite2 to FIN messages; it applies security controls to all supported services. TheSwift CSP FAQconfirms that Alliance Lite2 users must comply with controls for all active services, not just FIN.

Thus, the statement that it "only supports" FIN messages is false, as it also supports FileAct and InterAct.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The answer isB, as Alliance Lite2 supports more than just FIN messages, including FileAct and InterAct, per theSwift Alliance Lite2 User GuideandCSCF v2024.

References

Swift Alliance Lite2 User Guide, Section: Supported Services.

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Alliance Lite2 Scope.

This question addresses the eligibility of a SWIFT CSP Certified Assessor who leaves a listed provider to continue performing assessments independently:

Step 1: SWIFT CSP Assessor Certification Rules

The SWIFT CSP Independent Assessment Framework (IAF) specifies that assessors must be certified and affiliated with a SWIFT-approved provider listed in the Directory of CSP Assessment Providers. Certification is tied to the individual but exercised through the provider’s accreditation.

Step 2: Impact of Leaving a Provider

When an assessor leaves a listed provider, they lose the organizational backing required to conduct official CSP assessments. The IAF states that "assessments must be performed by approved providers," and independent operation without SWIFT’s formal re-approval or affiliation with another provider is not permitted, even during the certification validity period.

Alliance Lite2 is a cloud-based solution for smaller institutions, providing a lightweight interface to the SWIFT network. The messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 is a role responsible for managing message-related activities, typically through the Alliance Lite2 Business Application (L2BA) interface. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Can create and modify messages

This is correct. The primary role of a messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 is to create and modify SWIFT messages, such as payment instructions (e.g., MT103) or other FIN messages. This is a core function of the L2BA interface, which provides a browser-based platform for operators to input, edit, and send messages. SWIFT documentation for Alliance Lite2 confirms that messaging operators have the necessary permissions to perform these tasks, aligning with the operational workflows supported by the platform.

•Option B: Can assign RBAC roles to RMA operators and messaging operators

This is incorrect. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) role assignment in Alliance Lite2 is typically managed by a security officer or administrator role, not the messaging operator. The messaging operator’s scope is limited to message-related activities, not user or role management. In Alliance Lite2, RBAC is managed through the Alliance Web Platform, where a security officer (e.g., LSO) assigns roles to operators, including RMA (Relationship Management Application) operators and messaging operators. The CSCF Control "6.1 Security Awareness" emphasizes the separation of duties, ensuring that operational roles like messaging operators do not overlap with administrative roles.

•Option C: Can approve the Customer Security Officer change requests

This is incorrect. Approving Customer Security Officer (CSO) change requests is a high-level administrative task that falls under the purview of SWIFT’s security and compliance processes, often involving SWIFT’s support team or a designated administrator within the institution. In Alliance Lite2, this responsibility does not lie with the messaging operator, whose role is focused on message handling. The CSCF mandates strict controls for CSO changes, typically requiring multi-party approval outside the messaging operator’s scope.

•Option D: Can approve messages

This is correct. In Alliance Lite2, messaging operators can approve messages as part of the workflow, depending on the institution’s configuration. For example, a message created by one operator may require approval by another operator (or the same operator if configured with dual roles) before it is sent to the SWIFT network. This approval process ensures accuracy and compliance with internal controls, a feature supported by the L2BA interface in Alliance Lite2. SWIFT documentation highlights this capability as part of the messaging workflow.

Summary of Correct Answers:

The messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 can create and modify messages (A) and can approve messages (D), consistent with their operational role.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 6.1 emphasizes role separation, limiting messaging operators to message-related tasks.

•SWIFT Alliance Lite2 Documentation: Details the messaging operator’s role in creating, modifying, and approving messages via L2BA.

•SWIFT Security Guidelines: Highlights administrative roles for RBAC and CSO changes, excluding messaging operators.

This question assesses whether a short interview with the HR manager providing one example of security training implementation is acceptable for a small infrastructure with only two operators, under the Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Security Training Requirements

TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, underControl 5.1: Security Training and Awareness, mandates that all personnel with access to Swift-related systems (including operators) receive regular, documented security training. This includes awareness of security policies, procedures, and incident response. The control applies regardless of the size of the infrastructure.

Step 2: Analyze the Scenario

The entity has a small infrastructure with two operators, and the HR manager provides a short interview with one example of security training implementation.

TheIndependent Assessment Frameworkrequires assessors to validate the effectiveness of controls, including evidence of training completion, content, frequency, and attendance records. A risk-based approach allows flexibility, but minimum evidence standards must still be met.

Step 3: Evaluate Against CSCF Guidelines

Control 5.1specifies that training must be documented, with evidence such as training logs, attendance records, or certification. A single interview with one example does not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate:

That all operators (both in this case) have been trained.

The frequency and comprehensiveness of the training program.

The effectiveness of the training (e.g., understanding and application).

TheSwift CSP FAQandSecurity Best Practicesnote that even for small entities, assessors must see multiple pieces of evidence (e.g., training schedules, materials, test results) to confirm compliance, especially during an independent assessment.

A risk-based testing approach (mentioned in option A) allows tailoring the depth of evidence based on risk, but it does not exempt small entities from providing more than a single anecdotal example. TheIndependent Assessment Frameworkrequires objective evidence, not just verbal assurances.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The answer isB, as a short interview with one example is insufficient to meet the evidence requirements ofControl 5.1in theCSCF v2024. More evidence (e.g., training records, attendance logs, or test results) is required to validate compliance, even for a small infrastructure.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 5.1: Security Training and Awareness.

Swift Independent Assessment Framework, Section: Evidence Requirements.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Training Documentation.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Small Entity Compliance.

This question relates to Control 5.2 – Token Management in the CSCF, which outlines requirements for managing physical or software-based tokens used for authentication or cryptographic operations in the SWIFT environment. Let’s evaluate each option:

A. Similar to user accounts, individual assignment and ownership for accurate traceability and revocation in case of potential tampering, loss or in case of user role change

CSCF Control 5.2 mandates that tokens (e.g., HSM tokens or software tokens) be uniquely assigned to individuals to ensure traceability and accountability. This allows for revocation in cases of tampering, loss, or role changes, mirroring user account management principles under Control 5.1 – Logical Access Control.

SwiftNet Link (SNL) is the mandatory network interface software that enables connectivity to the SWIFTNet network, providing transport, security, and service management functionalities. The Swift Alliance Gateway (SAG) is a communication interface that consolidates message flows and relies on SNL to connect to SWIFTNet. According to SWIFT documentation, SAG is built on top of SNL, making SNL a prerequisite for SAG operation. This dependency is consistent across on-premises and cloud-based deployments (e.g., Alliance Connect Virtual), where SNL ensures secure communication over the SWIFT Secure IP Network (SIPN). The CSCF Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection" underscores the need for secure connectivity components like SNL. There are no documented scenarios where SAG can operate without SNL, confirming the statement is true.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.1 mandates secure connectivity components like SNL.

•SWIFT Alliance Gateway Documentation: SAG requires SNL for SWIFTNet connectivity.

•SWIFTNet Link Documentation: SNL is the mandatory interface for all SWIFTNet communications.

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The SWIFT CSP defines architecture types (A1 to A4) based on the components a user owns and manages, as outlined in the "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" and "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025." These types determine the applicable security controls and assessment requirements. Let’s analyze the scenario:

•A local communication interface refers to a component like Alliance Gateway (SAG), which manages connectivity to the SWIFT network via SwiftNet Link (SNL) and VPN boxes. The user owns this interface locally as their main channel.

•A connector (or customer connector) is a custom application or integration layer that connects to SWIFT services, often used as an alternative or backup channel. In this case, it serves as a contingency backup.

•The architecture types are:

oA1: Full stack (owns messaging interface, communication interface, and network components, e.g., Alliance Access, Alliance Gateway, VPN boxes).

oA2: Owns a customer connector and communication interface, with the messaging interface hosted elsewhere (e.g., by a service bureau or SWIFT).

oA3: Owns only a customer connector, relying on external communication and messaging interfaces.

oA4: Uses a fully hosted solution (e.g., Alliance Cloud or Lite2), owning no local components.

•The scenario indicates the user owns a local communication interface (e.g., SAG) as the primary channel and a connector as a backup. However, there is no mention of owning a messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access) locally. This suggests the messaging interface is likely hosted externally (e.g., by a service bureau or SWIFT), which aligns with the A2 architecture type. The "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" classifies A2 as a user with a communication interface and a customer connector, where the messaging interface is not locally owned. The backup connector does not change the primary architecture type, as it is an additional component within the A2 framework.

•Option A: A1

This is incorrect. A1 requires ownership of a messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access), which is not mentioned.

•Option B: A2

This is correct. A2 fits the scenario of owning a communication interface and a customer connector, with the messaging interface potentially hosted elsewhere.

•Option C: A3

This is incorrect. A3 involves only a customer connector, not a communication interface.

•Option D: A4

This is incorrect. A4 applies to fully hosted solutions with no local ownership of connectors or interfaces.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The SWIFT user with a local communication interface as the main channel and a connector as a backup is of architecture type A2 (B).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Defines architecture types A1-A4.

•CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree: Classifies A2 for communication interface and customer connector ownership.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Applies to A2 architecture.

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CSCF Control "4.2 Intrusion Detection" requires SWIFT users to detect unauthorized access or activities within the SWIFT environment. The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" allows flexibility in meeting this control using various technologies. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System)

This is valid. NIDS monitors network traffic to detect intrusions (e.g., on VPN boxes), aligning with Control "4.2" by identifying external threats.

•Option B: HIDS (Host Intrusion Detection System)

This is valid. HIDS monitors individual hosts (e.g., servers running Alliance Access) for suspicious activities, supporting Control "4.2" for internal threat detection.

•Option C: EDR and XDR (Endpoint Detection and Response, Extended Detection and Response)

This is valid. EDR and XDR provide advanced monitoring and response capabilities for endpoints and across environments, meeting Control "4.2" requirements for detecting and responding to intrusions.

•Option D: A combination of all of the above

This is correct. The CSCF encourages a layered security approach, and the "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" and "Assessment template for Mandatory controls" accept a combination of NIDS, HIDS, EDR, and XDR to comprehensively meet Control "4.2," depending on the architecture and risk profile.

Summary of Correct Answer:

Intrusion Detection Control can be met through a combination of NIDS, HIDS, EDR, and XDR (D).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 4.2 allows multiple detection technologies.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Supports combined approaches.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Includes various intrusion detection methods.

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The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" and "Independent Assessment Framework" outline conditions for relying on previous assessments. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: The control compliance conclusion must have already been relied on the past two years

This does not apply. There is no requirement that reliance has been used for two prior years; reliance is assessed annually based on current conditions, per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

•Option B: The previous assessment was performed on the CSCF version of the previous year (at least)

This does not apply. The CSCF version must match the current assessment year (e.g., v2025 for a 2025 assessment), not the previous year, to ensure alignment with updated controls, as per the "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025."

•Option C: The control definition has not changed

This applies. Reliance is permitted only if the control’s definition remains unchanged from the previous assessment, ensuring the prior conclusion remains relevant, as noted in the "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025."

•Option D: The control design and implementation are the same

This applies. The assessor must confirm that the control’s design and implementation have not changed since the last assessment, as required by the "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" to validate ongoing compliance.

Summary of Correct Answers:

Reliance is allowed if the control definition has not changed (C) and the control design and implementation are the same (D).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Lists conditions for reliance.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Requires unchanged definitions and designs.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Supports reliance criteria.

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The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and "Independent Assessment Framework" define the scope of controls to be assessed based on the user’s architecture type (A1-A4). Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Yes

This is incorrect. Not all controls (mandatory and advisory) must be assessed; only those applicable to the user’s architecture and attested to are required, per the "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree."

•Option B: No, only the mandatory controls

This is incorrect. While mandatory controls must be assessed, users may also attest to advisory controls voluntarily, and these must be included in the assessment if attested, as per the "Assessment template for Mandatory controls" and "Assessment template for Advisory controls."

•Option C: No, only the attested controls (with as a minimum the mandatory ones according to the architecture type)

This is correct. The CSP requires assessment of all mandatory controls applicable to the user’s architecture type, plus any advisory controls the user chooses to attest to. The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" and "Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template" confirm that the assessment focuses on attested controls, ensuring minimum mandatory coverage.

•Option D: No, the controls selection is agreed upfront between the SWIFT User and the assessor

This is incorrect. Control selection is not negotiable; it is determined by the architecture type and user attestation, not an ad-hoc agreement, as per the "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree."

Summary of Correct Answer:

Only the attested controls, with a minimum of mandatory ones per architecture type, must be assessed (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Defines mandatory and advisory controls.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Focuses on attested controls.

•CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree: Guides control applicability.

CSCF Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection" aims to secure the SWIFT infrastructure by isolating it from external threats and internal risks. The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" details its objectives. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Restrict malicious access from external sources

This applies. Control 1.1 requires isolating the SWIFT secure zone from external sources (e.g., the Internet) to prevent malicious access, such as malware or unauthorized intrusions.

•Option B: Forbids any interactive sessions towards the SWIFT infrastructure

This does not apply. Control 1.1 does not forbid all interactive sessions. It allows controlled interactive access (e.g., via jump servers) for administrative purposes, provided sessions are secured (e.g., encrypted per Control "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security"). The "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" permits interactive sessions with proper controls.

•Option C: Limit risks of privileged accounts compromise

This applies. Control 1.1 includes measures to secure privileged accounts (e.g., by enforcing strong authentication and role-based access control) to prevent compromise, aligning with CSCF principles.

•Option D: Limit risks of lateral movement

This applies. Control 1.1 aims to segment the SWIFT environment from the general IT environment, reducing the risk of lateral movement by attackers within the network.

Summary of Correct Answer:

Forbidding any interactive sessions (B) does not apply, as Control 1.1 allows controlled interactive access.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 1.1 objectives include restricting access and limiting risks, but not banning interactive sessions.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Confirms controlled interactive sessions are permitted.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Assesses secure access controls under 1.1.

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The SWIFT CSP requires a consistent and independent assessment process, as specified in the "Independent Assessment Framework" and "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines." Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Yes, a SWIFT user can combine multiple assessment types (internal and external assessment) as long as all controls are covered

This is incorrect. The CSP mandates that the assessment be conducted by a single, independent assessor or firm to ensure uniformity and objectivity. Mixing internal audits (which lack independence) with external assessments does not meet the requirement, as per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

•Option B: No, because the SWIFT user cannot be sure the same approach and quality will be delivered

This is incorrect as the primary reason. While consistency is a concern, the main issue is the lack of independence, not just quality variation.

•Option C: Yes, but only if there is a signed agreement between all involved assessors

This is incorrect. A signed agreement does not resolve the CSP’s requirement for a single independent assessment. The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" does not allow hybrid assessments.

•Option D: No, SWIFT can reject the attestation in such situations

This is correct. SWIFT reserves the right to reject attestations if the assessment process does not comply with the requirement for a fully independent assessment by a certified assessor. The "Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template" and "CSCF Assessment Completion Letter" must reflect a single, consistent evaluation, and the "Independent Assessment Framework" explicitly prohibits reliance on internal audits for compliance attestation.

Summary of Correct Answer:

This approach is not acceptable, and SWIFT can reject the attestation (D).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Framework: Requires a single independent assessor.

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Prohibits mixed assessment types.

•Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template: Reflects a unified assessment process.

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This question identifies the authentication methods supported by Alliance Interfaces (e.g., Alliance Access, Alliance Gateway) under theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024.

Step 1: Understand Authentication on Alliance Interfaces

TheCSCF v2024, underControl 2.3: System Access Control, mandates strong authentication for access to Swift-related components, including Alliance Interfaces. TheSwift Alliance Gateway Technical DocumentationandAlliance Access User Guidedetail supported methods.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. PasswordAlliance Interfaces support basic password authentication as a standard method, as noted in theAlliance Access User Guide. While not the strongest alone, it is permitted with additional controls.Conclusion: Correct.

B. LDAP AuthenticationLDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) is supported for centralized authentication, integrating with enterprise directory services, per theSwift Security Best PracticesandControl 2.3.Conclusion: Correct.

C. Radius One-time passwordRADIUS with one-time passwords (OTP) is not a standard authentication method for Alliance Interfaces. TheAlliance Gateway Technical Documentationdoes not list RADIUS OTP as supported, focusing instead on password, LDAP, and TOTP.Conclusion: Incorrect.

D. Password and TOTPTime-based One-Time Password (TOTP) combined with password (multi-factor authentication) is supported for enhanced security, as required byControl 2.3and detailed in theSwift Security Best Practicesfor privileged access.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answers areA, B, and D, as these methods are supported by Alliance Interfaces, aligning withCSCF v2024and related documentation.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.3: System Access Control.

Swift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation, Section: Authentication Methods.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Multi-Factor Authentication.