Fortinet FCSS_SOC_AN-7.4 Dumps Questions Answers

Understanding the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix:

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.

Each tactic in the matrix represents the "why" of an attack technique, while each technique represents "how" an adversary achieves a tactic.

Analyzing the Provided Exhibit:

The exhibit shows part of the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix as displayed on FortiAnalyzer.

The focus is on technique T1071 (Application Layer Protocol), which has subtechniques labeled T1071.001, T1071.002, T1071.003, and T1071.004.

Each subtechnique specifies a different type of application layer protocol used for Command and Control (C2):

T1071.001 Web Protocols

T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols

T1071.003 Mail Protocols

T1071.004 DNS

Identifying Key Points:

Subtechniques under T1071:There are four subtechniques listed under the primary technique T1071, confirming that statement B is true.

Event Handlers for T1071:FortiAnalyzer includes event handlers for monitoring various tactics and techniques. The presence of event handlers for tactic T1071 suggests active monitoring and alerting for these specific subtechniques, confirming that statement C is true.

Misconceptions Clarified:

Statement A (four techniques under tactic T1071) is incorrect because T1071 is a single technique with four subtechniques.

Statement D (15 events associated with the tactic) is misleading. The number 15 refers to the techniques under the Application Layer Protocol, not directly related to the number of events.

Conclusion:

The accurate interpretation of the exhibit confirms that there are four subtechniques under technique T1071 and that there are event handlers covering tactic T1071.

References:

MITRE ATT&CK Framework documentation.

FortiAnalyzer Event Handling and MITRE ATT&CK Integration guides.

Understanding FortiAnalyzer Fabric Topology:

The FortiAnalyzer Fabric topology is designed to centralize logging and analysis across multiple devices in a network.

It involves a hierarchy where the supervisor node manages and coordinates with other Fabric members.

Analyzing the Options:

Option A:Downstream collectors forwarding logs to Fabric members is not a typical configuration. Instead, logs are usually centralized to the supervisor.

Option B:For effective management and log centralization, logging devices must be registered to the supervisor. This ensures proper log collection and coordination.

Option C:The supervisor does not primarily use an API to store logs, incidents, and events locally. Logs are stored directly in the FortiAnalyzer database.

Option D:For the Fabric topology to function correctly, all Fabric members need to be in analyzer mode. This mode allows them to collect, analyze, and forward logs appropriately within the topology.

Conclusion:

The correct statements regarding the FortiAnalyzer Fabric topology are that logging devices must be registered to the supervisor and that Fabric members must be in analyzer mode.

References:

Fortinet Documentation on FortiAnalyzer Fabric Topology.

Best Practices for Configuring FortiAnalyzer in a Fabric Environment.

Understanding the Threat Hunting Data:

The Threat Hunting Monitor in the provided exhibits shows various application services, their usage counts, and data metrics such as sent bytes, average sent bytes, and maximum sent bytes.

The second part of the exhibit lists connection attempts from a specific source IP (10.0.1.10) to a destination IP (8.8.8.8), with repeated "Connection Failed" messages.

Analyzing the Application Services:

DNS is the top application service with a significantly high count (251,400) and notable sent bytes (9.1 MB).

This large volume of DNS traffic is unusual for regular DNS queries and can indicate the presence of DNS tunneling.

DNS Tunneling:

DNS tunneling is a technique used by attackers to bypass security controls by encoding data within DNS queries and responses. This allows them to extract data from the local network without detection.

The high volume of DNS traffic, combined with the detailed metrics, suggests that DNS tunneling might be in use.

Connection Failures to 8.8.8.8:

The repeated connection attempts from the source IP (10.0.1.10) to the destination IP (8.8.8.8) with connection failures can indicate an attempt to communicate with an external server.

Google DNS (8.8.8.8) is often used for DNS tunneling due to its reliability and global reach.

Conclusion:

Given the significant DNS traffic and the nature of the connection attempts, it is reasonable to conclude that DNS tunneling is being used to extract confidential data from the local network.

Why Other Options are Less Likely:

Spearphishing (A): There is no evidence from the provided data that points to spearphishing attempts, such as email logs or phishing indicators.

Reconnaissance (C): The data does not indicate typical reconnaissance activities, such as scanning or probing mail servers.

FTP C&C (D): There is no evidence of FTP traffic or command-and-control communications using FTP in the provided data.

References:

SANS Institute: "DNS Tunneling: How to Detect Data Exfiltration and Tunneling Through DNS Queries" SANS DNS Tunneling

OWASP: "DNS Tunneling" OWASP DNS Tunneling

By analyzing the provided threat hunting data, it is evident that DNS tunneling is being used to exfiltrate data, indicating a sophisticated method of extracting confidential information from the network.